This review was written on December 13th 2003
This is some writing I did on holiday in Cyprus on the 25
May 2001 while staying with Paddy and Valerie Hogan at their villa in Paphos.
Intensely warm, perfect weather, nice villa overlooking a fine pool. Since
leaving Dublin on 20 May I have been reading The Last Days of Dublin Castle
edited by Michael Hopkinson. Having read the first half of the book, I wrote
the following commentary:
The
Last Days of Dublin Castle contains the diaries of Mark Sturgis, who was a
senior official (to some extent without portfolio) in Dublin Castle between
July 1920 and January 1922. It is the first work I have read from the British
point of view about this critical period and it provides me with a few
important insights into the history of the War of Independence leading up to
the Truce and the ratification of the Treaty.
I
was astonished by the incompetence of the British during this time, with
widespread indecision, disagreement and jealousy between the military and administrative
officials in Dublin, and their colleagues and political chiefs in London. This
circumstance in the British administration had two serious consequences.
Firstly,
genuine peace feelings from both sides commenced in October 1920 and continued
with various degrees of intensity right up to the actual truce on 11 July 1921.
The final six months of the War of Independence were the most violent and
bloody of the War which compounded the bitterness between the IRA and the
British. Furthermore, and significant in relation to the ensuing Civil War, the
delay in arranging a truce compounded the differences between those among the
IRA and Sinn Féin who were willing to compromise on the constitutional question
(and who were supported by the great majority of the Southern Irish population)
and the intractable group who were rigidly committed to the republic. There is
no doubt that the views of the latter hardened during the last few months of
the War.
Patrick Joseph Clune |
There
is no doubt that the Irish leaders, Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins (de
Valera was in America at the time), would have agreed a truce in November 1920
if Lloyd George had not insisted on decommissioning and if he was not so
deluded as to think that ‘he had murder by the throat’.
Mark Sturgis, bottom right. |
Auxiliaries |
My
father, Richard Mulcahy, who was the head of the IRA during the War of Independence,
often said to me that, if the British Army had been given full authority and
adequate resources under the leadership of Macready, it would have been
impossible to continue the guerrilla campaign and an early end of the war would
have been inevitable, to the disadvantage of the separatist movement. He stated
that the IRA campaign would have lasted a week if the British Army had taken
over full control.
It will be found that at this time
the military were pressing more and more for permission to make the matter a
military job. Our whole tactics at
the time were directed to keeping the struggle at a police level (1)
------evacuated police barracks and
tax offices were chosen for burning at Easter 1920 in order to demonstrate that
the Volunteers were attacking the British Administration and not the British
Army. They were, he said, not in a
position to challenge the British Army (2)
----we have not been able to drive
the enemy from anything but from a fairly good-sized police barracks (3).
Sturgis
refers frequently to the urgent need to unify all the elements of the British
authority in Ireland. It is clear that he was strongly of the opinion that, if
the British hoped to defeat the IRA, the answer was a military one with
nationwide martial law and with full military control of the police. Despite
the pro-military view of Sturgis, shared with other members of the British establishment, two
battalions of the army were
transferred to England in April 1921 at the height of the War, one from Dublin
and one from Belfast, in anticipation of a general strike by miners and other
worker in England.
Black and Tans |
Of
course, Lloyd George and his cabinet colleagues refused to admit to the
Americans and the outside world that the disturbances in Ireland constituted a
war and therefore they may have been reluctant to leave control of the police
and the administration to the military. The role of Westminster was also
seriously affected by the grossly inaccurate reports supplied by the Irish
Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood, such as the charge that the IRA was responsible
for the burning of Cork City, a charge which was hardly credible to the British
and later denied by Macready.
Somebody
on the British side, when discussing self government for the Irish, protested
that the Irish would be unable to govern themselves. His companion replied
‘Neither can the British’. The story of the British administration in Ireland
during the War of Independence is a striking confirmation of this riposte
Asquith
is mentioned in the diaries from time to time. He was a dove who approved a
more active and conciliatory approach by the British Government, and who
thought that the failure of the Clune truce was a big opportunity missed
Sturgis
had been Asquith’s private secretary. He was seconded to the Irish Office after
Asquith had retired as prime minister. He was wealthy and a prominent social
light, closely connected with the establishment, passionate about racing,
enjoyed Jammets and the Shelbourne, and enjoyed Ireland and the Irish with a
hedonistic streak despite the stresses of his eighteen months in Dublin Castle.
It is clear from the diaries that he had a sense of realism and a vision that a
reasonable settlement must come, that the British government, with better understanding
in Westminster and with generosity, had it within its power to reach agreement
which should have satisfied both nations and which should have been achieved
before 1921. Whilst agreement and a settlement did come to pass with the Treaty
ratification, divisions within the British establishment in Westminster and
incompetence in Dublin and London ensured that agreement was only reached when
the seeds of our civil war had been sown.
I
was half way through the diaries when I wrote the above commentary. I added the
following remarks after I had completed the book.
I
was intrigued by Father O’Flanagan’s contributions to the continued attempts to
arrange a truce from late 1920 onwards. I had been under the impression that
O’Flanagan invoked the disapproval of the Sinn Fein and IRA leaders when he
intervened during the Clune negotiations because of his ‘premature’ and his
‘unauthorised’ intervention with Lloyd George. I was surprised therefore to
find that he continued being involved in truce negotiations for most of the
time up to the end of the War, and that he appeared to have the approval of de
Valera and others in continuing these informal negotiations. It is clear also
at the time that Father O’Flanagan was in favour of a reasonable settlement, such
as Dominion status, and yet, when it came to the Treaty settlement, he was one
of its most ardent and vociferous opponents. And O’Flanagan was not by any
means the only person who bitterly opposed the Treaty and yet who appeared to
be satisfied with Dominion settlement during the later months of the War.
Sturgis
makes one rather interesting comment in 6 June 1921, referring to the American
reaction to de Valera’s involvement in certain truce and peace activities.
Sturgis states as follows
It seems that the Irish Americans, who got wind up
when Craig and de Valera met during the Truce, wrote and wired that Dev and
Sinn Féin were giving away ‘the Republican principle. They appeared to exert
considerable pressure’ on the issue (P 185).
One
wonders whether Dev’s prolonged stay in the United States might have been
responsible for the intractable views of many Irish Americans on the question
of the settlement, or did the American rather remote and unrealistic views on a
settlement lead to a hardening of Dev’s outlook? Dev’s 19 months in America
during the War of Independence, by referring so frequently during his many
speeches to the Irish Republic might have had a deleterious effect on Irish
American opinion.
Despite
de Valera’s return from America at Christmas 1920, it is clear from the diaries
that one obstacle in arranging a
truce was the difficulty of contacting de Valera and having him show some
initiative in meeting with the British while many others on the nationalist
side were active in seeking a truce. Dev remained an ephemeral figure despite
the British perception that he was the leader of the separatist movement and
that little could be achieved without his active input. This gave rise to
Sturgis’s comment that
If we want to deal with England there’s L.G. - if
we want to talk to Ulster there’s Craig or Carson, but when we want to talk to
S.F. it’s a heterogeneous ‘collection’ of individuals ------ all over the
place, and they severally, if they know their minds, which I doubt they
certainly don’t, know each other and all fear to act off their own bat. (P188)
It
is strange that Dev returned to Ireland unexpectedly just before Christmas 1920
and
apparently after a tip off from a British diplomat in America that
Lloyd George was anxious for a
settlement and yet it was to take another seven months to arrange a truce. Nothing could be done
without Dev on the issue despite the influence of such leaders as Griffith and
Collins. Who did Dev speak to on the issue of a truce during these important
seven months of the War? Did Childers have any role in the delay after he met
Dev on the latter’s return from America?
Collins, centre, at the treaty negotiations. |
When
Lloyd George eventually wrote the letter inviting de Valera to London, which
preceded the truce; it is interesting that it was Erskine Childers who was most
opposed to the truce initiative. Sturgis stated on the 27 June 1921 when the
truce was pending
The two sources from which alone this morning come
shrieks of rage and suspicion are the Morning
Post and Erskine Childers who agree from their poles asunder to regard the L.G.
letter as a snare of the most traitorous description. (P194).
Sturgis
describes an interview Loughnane had with Hugh Martin of the Daily News. In
this interview, Richard Mulcahy’s name is associated with Cathal Brugha
(Burgess) and Austin Stack as ‘The other extremists in favour of a war to the
knife policy ----’. And in the same interview Mulcahy as chief of staff and
Burgess as minister for defence are stated to be the persons directly in
control of the IRA. He states that Childers, Burgess and Stack are not
interested in any settlement ‘they do not hope for success but prefer to fight
and fail ---’
Mulcahy
may have been in control of the IRA but on the question of extremism his name
could never be attached to those of Childers, Burgess and Stack.
Dublin Castle |
The
earlier part of Durrell’s book, which deals with his setting up house in
Cyprus, is over-sentimental and tedious, but the later chapters which deal with
the worsening political situation in the island will be of interest to students
of the history and demise of the British Empire.
(1)
(Annotation
vol I, pp 144, 145)
(2)
(Tape
093 131A 125A)
(3)
(Dail
debate on the Treaty, p 143)